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I. INTRODUCTION 
As one of the few issues that does not live neatly on partisan lines, the 
mention of publicly attended, yet privately run charter schools is sure to incite 
impassioned debate on either side of the aisle. Less often discussed is how the 
laws that govern these schools play into their operation, and thus the public’s 
opinion of charters.  
Charters began as a concept of the “economic free market theory,” 
theorizing that if parents had choice in schools, the surrounding school systems 
would improve.1 Charters were thought to promote experimentation, with lax 
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 1 Dylan P. Grady, Charter School Revocation: A Method for Efficiency, 
Accountability, and Success, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 513, 520 (2012). Milton Friedman first 
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governance and less oversight, from which public schools could take best 
practices for their own use.2 Minnesota launched the nation’s first charter 
schools by passing legislation in 1991, and opening its first charter school in 
1992.3 Charter school enrollment, nationally, has increased every year from 
1999 to 2014, with charter schools educating over 2.5 million children 
nationwide.4 Race to the Top, a Department of Education funding program 
implemented by the Obama Administration,5 incentivized the creation of charter 
schools and the removal of caps that states have placed on the total number of 
charter schools permitted within that state.6 “[Forty-three] states and the District 
of Columbia” now have laws allowing charter schools.7 Charter schools have 
thus remained in the national conversation as an important, and often-discussed, 
component of education reform. President Donald Trump’s controversial 
appointment of Betsy DeVos has reignited the nation’s debate over school 
choice,8 and likely will move decision-making about important education 
issues, such as how to help struggling students previously covered under No 
Child Left Behind, back to the states.9 
After teaching in a charter school in New York City for two years, I was 
surprised to come to Ohio and see the amount of vitriol directed toward charter 
schools in the state. The laws governing Ohio’s charter schools provided a 
helpful key to understanding that sentiment further. Ohio’s charter schools are 
                                                                                                                     
proposed a school voucher system in 1955 to allow markets to work freely, and to minimize 
government interference. Terry M. Moe, Beyond the Free Market: The Structure of School 
Choice, 2008 BYU L. REV. 557, 558–59 (2008). 
 2 RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG & HALLEY POTTER, A SMARTER CHARTER: FINDING 
WHAT WORKS FOR CHARTER SCHOOLS AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 6–7 (2014). 
 3 Grady, supra note 1, at 522. 
 4 Charter School Data Dashboard, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHOOLS, 
http://dashboard2.publiccharters.org/National/ [https://perma.cc/HS2S-BYF5]. 
 5 Race to the Top, WHITE HOUSE, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/education/ 
k-12/race-to-the-top [https://perma.cc/BAR4-9NXV].  
 6 Press Release, John White, Press Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., States Open to 
Charters Start Fast in ‘Race to Top’ (June 8, 2009), http://www2.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/ 
2009/06/06082009a.html [https://perma.cc/9VAR-NEGB]. 
 7 Jennifer Thomsen, 50-State Comparison: Charter School Policies, EDUC. 
COMMISSION STATES (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.ecs.org/charter-school-policies/ 
[https://perma.cc/34DP-3MU2]. 
 8 See Emmarie Huetteman & Yamiche Alcindor, Betsy DeVos Confirmed as Education 
Secretary; Pence Breaks Tie, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/ 
07/us/politics/betsy-devos-education-secretary-confirmed.html?_r=0 (on file with Ohio State 
Law Journal). “For many educators, Ms. DeVos’s support for charter schools and 
vouchers . . . reflected a deep disconnect from public schools. . . . Ms. DeVos’s critics said 
they would continue to fight her as she serves.” Id. 
 9 Patrick O’Donnell, What Would Betsy DeVos Mean for Ohio Schools?, 
CLEVELAND.COM (Feb. 4, 2017), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2017/02/what_ 
would_betsy_devos_mean_fo.html [https://perma.cc/S9XQ-GLGF]. “Trump has proposed 
giving states $20 billion to expand school choices, a fund that DeVos and the Department of 
Education likely would oversee.” Id. 
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largely reviled because of their low rates of success,10 embroilment with 
scandal,11 and misspent money.12 They have even drawn media attention, such 
as that from John Oliver’s Last Week Tonight.13  
In late 2016, Ohio’s charter school advocacy group, the “Ohio Alliance for 
Public Charter Schools [(OAPCS)] announced . . . that it [would] close at the 
end of the year.”14 Previously, OAPCS received funding from private funders, 
such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Walton Family 
Foundation.15 These private foundations were no longer listed as donors to 
OAPCS in late 2016, and at least one organization indicated that Ohio would no 
longer be targeted for receipt of funding.16 Much of the dismay surrounding 
these schools can be traced to flexible laws that govern these schools’ sponsors.  
                                                                                                                     
 10 See Doug Livingston, Four Ohio Charter Schools To Close for Poor Academic 
Performance; One in Canton, AKRON BEACON J. (June 3, 2015), 
http://www.ohio.com/news/break-news/four-ohio-charter-schools-to-close-for-poor-academic-
performance-one-in-canton-1.597172 [https://perma.cc/57NQ-LH4G]. “The Ohio Department of 
Education has taken control of eight charter schools and has initiated the process of closing 
four for poor academic performance . . . . [A]bout 700 children were in the failed charters.” 
Id. 
 11 Kimberly Hefling, Charter School Scandal Haunts John Kasich, POLITICO (Mar. 14, 
2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/charter-school-scandal-haunts-john-kasich-
220700 [https://perma.cc/5KZB-Z35S]. David Hansen, former Ohio charter school chief and 
husband to John Kasich’s former presidential campaign manager Beth Hansen, 
“acknowledg[es] that he didn’t include the grades of online charter schools in ratings of their 
oversight agencies.” Id.  
The online schools are generally low-performing and have ties to GOP donors . . . .  
 . . . [T]he state took the embarrassing step in January [2016] of updating its 
application figures [for a $71 million federal Education Department grant] to say that 
instead of having nine charter schools that are poor performing, [fifty-seven] are in that 
condition. 
Id. 
 12 Doug Livingston, Charter Schools Misspend Millions of Ohio Tax Dollars as Efforts 
To Police Them Are Privatized, AKRON BEACON J. (May 30, 2015), http://www.ohio.com/ 
news/local/charter-schools-misspend-millions-of-ohio-tax-dollars-as-efforts-to-police-
them-are-privatized-1.596318 [https://perma.cc/4QKX-TBTX].  
[C]harter schools misspend public money nearly four times more often than any other 
type of taxpayer-funded agency.  
 Since 2001, state auditors have uncovered $27.3 million improperly spent by 
charter schools, many run by for-profit companies, enrolling thousands of children and 
producing academic results that rival the worst in the nation. 
Id. 
 13 Charter Schools: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO television broadcast 
Aug. 21, 2016). 
 14 Bill Bush, Ohio Charter-School Advocacy Group Disbanding, COLUMBUS DISPATCH 
(Dec. 14, 2016), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2016/12/14/ohio-charter-school-
advocacy-group-disbanding.html# [https://perma.cc/8YX2-TXUA]. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
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Though certainly not all Ohio charter schools are failing,17 Ohio’s laws have 
reduced the state’s charter schools to a national laughingstock.18 This 
delegitimizes those schools that are doing good work, harms children who need 
great schools, and harms those families who have placed their trust in these 
private entities. Attempts at reform have come about in the state. Ohio’s House 
Bill 2 was passed into law on October 7, 2015, and was enacted February 1, 
2016.19 Ohio’s Senate Bill 148 remains (likely lifeless)20 in the Education 
Subcommittee of the greater Finance Committee.21 
Various nonprofit organizations seek to “rank” the states based on the 
strengths of their charter school laws.22 Different nonprofit organizations have 
different aims that they seek to further; this Note’s proposals seek to further 
high-quality education. This Note is not unabashedly pro-charter schools. 
Though charters offer innovation and options in communities that traditionally 
lack school choice, failing charter schools are failing schools—failing schools 
fail children and communities. Given the discord and division that charter 
schools can create in communities, charter institutions must be held to at least 
the same high standard as their traditional public peers. 
This Note seeks to understand how Ohio’s charter school laws currently 
function compared to the laws of other states, and proposes how Ohio’s laws 
can be improved. Part II first explains the structure by which Ohio’s charter 
schools are run; where the state grants authority to an authorizer, who grants 
authority to a charter school to operate. Part III will look at two reform attempts 
                                                                                                                     
 17 For a list of ratings of community schools, see OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC., 2015–2016 
COMMUNITY SCHOOL GRADES, http://education.ohio.gov/getattachment/Topics/Data/Report-
Card-Resources/Community-Schools-GRADES.xlsx.aspx [https://perma.cc/5D8F-9JNQ].  
 18 See Patrick O’Donnell, Ohio’s Charter Schools Ridiculed at National Conference, 
Even by National Charter Supporters, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 4, 2015), 
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2015/03/ohios_charter_schools_ridicule.html 
[https://perma.cc/5FMK-LLJJ] (“Ohio’s $1 Billion charter school system was the butt of 
jokes at a conference for reporters on school choice in Denver late last week . . . . The shots 
came from expected critics like teachers unions, but also from pro-charter voices . . . .”); see 
also Doug Livingston, Ohio Charter Schools Identified as Among Worst in Nation, AKRON 
BEACON J. (Mar. 1, 2015), http://www.ohio.com/news/break-news/ohio-charter-schools-
identified-as-among-worst-in-nation-1.570727 [https://perma.cc/8F9A-NQCQ] (“While 
panelists disagreed on how much regulation should be applied to charter schools, . . . there 
was little debate about where some of the lowest performing charter school companies 
operate.”). One panelist said that Mike Petrilli, President of the Ohio authorizer Fordham 
Institute, “could probably go down a list of Ohio operators that fall into this category.” Id. 
 19 H.R. 2, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2016). 
 20 See infra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
 21 See S. 148, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015). 
 22 See, e.g., NAT’L ALL. FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., MEASURING UP TO THE MODEL 74–
75 (7th ed. 2016), http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Model-Law-
Final_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/UG35-86W4] (ranking Ohio twenty-third in the country for 
its charter school laws); Ohio #11, CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, http://educationopportunityindex. 
edreform.com/parent-power-index/OH/ [https://perma.cc/E36G-8A9E] (ranking Ohio eleventh in 
the country for its charter school laws).  
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that have been debated in the Ohio legislature—a looser, but enacted piece of 
legislation, and a stricter, but unenacted piece. Finally, Part IV will give 
recommendations to the states for better oversight of charter school authorizers 
based upon the legislation that is working in some states and Ohio’s own 
attempts to restructure governance. Some of these recommendations include 
better state control of charter school authorizers, defined separation of church 
and state, defined separation of control between an authorizer and a school, and 
reforming the school reporting system to both better identify failing schools and 
to better promote report card information to families. 
II. OHIO LAW—HOW ARE CHARTERS IN THE STATE OF OHIO 
ORGANIZED? 
The Community Schools Act, enacted in Ohio in 1997, added Ohio to the 
mix of states that permitted charter schools.23 Community schools, also known 
as charter schools, are publicly funded, privately run, free, and openly attended 
institutions.24 When charter schools were proposed by then-President of the 
American Federation of Teachers Albert Shanker in front of the National Press 
Club in 1988, they were visualized as a type of laboratory, in which teachers 
could experiment with new and innovative ways of teaching.25 These schools 
were thought to exist as a potential model, from which traditional public schools 
could draw best practices.26 With less rigid governance than traditional public 
schools, theorists also proposed that teachers could give input on the way in 
which the school was run; this was thought to improve teacher morale and 
retention.27 Shanker proposed that traditional public schools served only some 
20% of students adequately, and that different types of schools could better 
address the needs of the other 80% of students.28 Shanker’s proposal initially 
incorporated the influence of unions and union policy, and also included the 
bending of some rules in order to allow for innovation.29 Contrast this with 
today, where teachers unions are typically pitted against charter schools;30 a 
                                                                                                                     
 23 H.R. 215, 122d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1997). 
 24 Anya Kamenetz, Bernie Sanders Says He Opposes Private Charter Schools. What 
Does That Mean?, NPR (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2016/03/15/4703762 
73/bernie-sanders-says-he-opposes-private-charter-schools-what-does-that-mean [https://perma.cc/ 
8M9W-5K56]. 
 25 KAHLENBERG & POTTER, supra note 2, at 6–7. 
 26 Id. at 7. 
 27 See id. at 6–8. 
 28 Id. at 7. 
 29 Id. at 8. 
 30 See Elias Isquith, Charter Schools’ Worst Nightmare: A Pro-Union Movement May 
Change Charters Forever, SALON (July 18, 2015), https://www.salon.com/2015/07/18/ 
charter_schools_worst_nightmare_a_pro_union_movement_may_change_charters_forever/ 
[https://perma.cc/B54H-YAVE] (“And if you happen to think of teachers unions at some 
point . . . you’ll probably have them in the role they’re traditionally assigned by the media—
as anti-charter and anti-reform.”); Randi Weingarten, A Coordinated National Effort To 
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Center for Education Reform study found that “[o]nly about 7[%] of charter 
schools were unionized in 2012.”31 
Ohio structures the governance hierarchy of traditional public schools with 
the Ohio Department of Education at the top, a publicly elected district school 
board below the Ohio Department of Education, a superintendent, chosen by the 
district school board, sitting below, and the schools at the bottom, under the 
governance of the superintendent.32 Community schools also have the Ohio 
Department of Education at the top, but place a sponsor immediately beneath 
the department.33 Beneath the sponsor, the school has a board that is privately 
appointed.34 Community schools can be run either directly by these boards, 
without the use of a superintendent, or by an external operator.35 Operators can 
provide any level of service that the school agrees to; some sample services 
include professional development, recruitment, and fundraising.36 Nonprofit 
operations are called community management organizations, or CMOs.37 For-
profit organizations are called education management organizations, or 
EMOs.38 Often, charter schools that are part of a network will allow an operator 
to take charge of day-to-day governance.39 
A. What Is a Sponsor? 
A sponsor is a middleman between the state and a charter school; sponsors 
grant charter schools in the state of Ohio the authority to operate.40 Sponsors are 
                                                                                                                     
Decimate Public Schools, HUFFPOST (Apr. 13, 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/randi-
weingarten/a-coordinated-national-ef_b_9683210.html [https://perma.cc/RQ6M-ZLVK]  
(explaining the opinion of Weingarten, President of the American Federation of Teachers, 
who is largely critical of charter schools); Hella Winston, How Charter Schools Bust Unions, 
SLATE (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/the_grind/2016/09/the_ 
lengths_that_charter_schools_go_to_when_their_teachers_try_to_form_unions.html  
[https://perma.cc/BX9J-VHSL] (expressing the stories of various charter schoolteachers 
treated with hostility by their employers after attempts to unionize). 
 31 Arianna Prothero, Why More Charter Schools Aren’t Unionized, EDUC. WK.: 
CHARTERS & CHOICE (Sept. 18, 2014), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/charterschoice/2014/09/ 
why_more_charter_schools_arent_unionized.html [https://perma.cc/4NE9-GRJ8]. 
 32 JESSICA POINER, THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., OHIO COMMUNITY SCHOOL 
GOVERNANCE: AN OVERVIEW 2–3 (Sept. 2015), http://edex.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/ 
publication/pdfs/Charter%20School%20Governance%20final%20for%20publication%20as%20o
f%209-15-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/HB3P-2PR3]. 
 33 Id. at 3. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 3, 5. 
 36 Id. at 5. 
 37 Id. 
 38 POINER, supra note 32, at 5. Operators often operate networks of charter schools; 
these schools are sometimes across multiple states. Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.02(A)(1) (West Supp. 2017); see also Ohio School 
Sponsorship Program, OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC., http://education.ohio.gov/Topics/Quality-School-
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also responsible for some level of operational and financial oversight.41 
Sponsors can receive a portion of the money given to a charter in order to 
recover costs of oversight.42 Sponsors are often known as “authorizers” outside 
the state of Ohio.43 
In the state of Ohio, groups who can sponsor charter schools include: the 
Ohio Department of Education Office of School Sponsorship, the local school 
district’s board of education, a school district’s board of education in the same 
county, the board of education of a joint vocational school district, an 
educational service center’s governing board, a state university’s board of 
trustees, or a qualified tax-exempt 501(c)(3) entity.44 To be a qualifying 
501(c)(3) entity, the group must have been in operation for at least five years 
prior to becoming a school sponsor, must have “assets of at least five hundred 
thousand dollars and a demonstrated record of financial responsibility,” the 
entity may not itself be a community school, and the entity must be deemed by 
the Ohio Department of Education to be an “education-oriented entity . . . [with 
a] demonstrated record of successful implementation of educational 
programs.”45 In practice, a “qualifying 501(c)(3) entity” is loosely defined.46  
Qualifying groups range widely.47 The Thomas B. Fordham Institute, for 
example, is an authorizer that also produces research and expert testimony for 
the education reform movement.48 St. Aloysius Orphanage of Cincinnati 
sponsors around forty charter schools,49 but has contracted “sponsorship 
                                                                                                                     
Choice/Ohio-School-Sponsorship-Program [https://perma.cc/27GD-4SZ4] (last modified Dec. 
29, 2017). 
 41 POINER, supra note 32, at 4. 
 42 See Jim Siegel & Catherine Candisky, Charter School Sponsors Say Ohio’s New 
Evaluations Go Overboard, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (July 31, 2016), http://www.dispatch.com/ 
content/stories/local/2016/07/31/strict-evaluations-required-of-charter-school-sponsors.html 
[https://perma.cc/VZ82-VWAT] (“The nonprofit sponsors allow schools to stay open and 
collect up to 3[%] of the school’s state revenue.”). 
 43 Patrick O’Donnell, Ohio’s New Charter School “Reform” Effort: What’s All This 
Talk About Sponsors?, CLEVELAND.COM (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/ 
index.ssf/2015/02/ohios_new_charter_school_reform_effort_whats_all_this_roundabout_talk_abo
ut_sponsors.html [https://perma.cc/NZ92-7AA8]. 
 44 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.02(C). 
 45 Id. § 3314.02(C)(1)(f). 
 46 See, e.g., Full List of 501(c)3 Authorizers/Sponsors, OHIO ALLIANCE FOR PUB. 
CHARTER SCHOOLS, http://www.oapcs.org/resources/full-list-501c3-authorizerssponsors 
[https://perma.cc/7DSH-NKXA]. The Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, whose primary 
mission is to build affordable housing, is also a sponsor of some fifty-one community 
schools. About Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, BUCKEYE COMMUNITY HOPE 
FOUND., http://buckeyehope.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/V86E-GTW4]. 
 47 See Full List of 501(c)3 Authorizers/Sponsors, supra note 46. 
 48 About Us, THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., https://edexcellence.net/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/L9Q6-7NBF]. 
 49 Full List of 501(c)3 Authorizers/Sponsors, supra note 46. 
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services” out to a limited liability company, Charter School Specialists.50 St. 
Aloysius Orphanage, and thus also Charter School Specialists, were the 
responsible sponsors in the scandal-laden case of Olympus Charter Schools, a 
group of eight charter schools that were managed by a for-profit corporation and 
only operated for a month before they “collapsed.”51 At the time that the schools 
closed, the eight schools were serving a total of 128 students, even though the 
state had been paying for 700 students.52 Charter School Specialists was to serve 
as the treasurer for Olympus Charter Schools and as its sponsor’s “financial 
watchdog,” which a spokesperson from the company believed “was not a 
conflict of interest.”53 
A more egregious example of a corrupt authorizer is Kids Count of Dayton, 
Inc.54 Kids Count lists on its website that its explicit mission is to “promote K–
12 educational excellence through high quality charter school authorizing.”55 
Kids Count was the authorizer tasked with overseeing Richard Allen Schools.56 
The Institute of Charter School Management Resources (a for-profit company) 
provided consulting for and collected lease payments from Richard Allen 
Schools.57 The Institute of Management Resources (a nonprofit group) managed 
the financial resources for Richard Allen Schools.58 Jeanette Harris founded 
Kids Count; Jeanette Harris served as the CEO and President of Richard Allen 
Schools; Jeanette Harris ran the Institute of Charter School Management 
Resources; Jeanette Harris founded the Institute of Management Resources.59 
This web meant that the schools were essentially overseen by themselves, and 
that one group was able to cycle taxpayer dollars into personal income. Kids 
Count of Dayton still authorizes charter schools today.60 
                                                                                                                     
 50 OHIO SEC’Y OF STATE, DOC. 200423803352, ARTICLES OF ORGANIZATION/DOM. 
LLC (2004), http://www2.sos.state.oh.us/reports/rwservlet?imgc12g&Din=200423803352 
[https://perma.cc/N8C2-GGZ2]; Client Spotlight: St. Aloysius Orphanage, CHARTER SCH. 
SPECIALISTS, http://www.charterschoolspec.com/pages/client_spotlight.asp  
[https://perma.cc/8B3F-RZAR]. 
 51 Bill Bush, Taxpayers’ $1.2 Million Propped Up Owner’s 2nd Charter-School Bust, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2013/11 
/19/ohios-1-2m-propped-up-owners-2nd-charter-bust.html [https://perma.cc/ZBU4-6CKS]. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See Christopher Magan & Margo Rutledge Kissell, Lack of Oversight an Issue for 
Model Charter School System, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (June 12, 2011), 
http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/local/lack-oversight-issue-for-model-charter-
school-system/c97phzmbZ86WHQpVpZjPkI/ [https://perma.cc/DLV8-TBDE]. 
 55 KIDS COUNT OF DAYTON, INC., http://www.kidscountdayton.com/  
[https://perma.cc/TCT6-KHRZ]. 
 56 Magan & Kissell, supra note 54. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Kids Count of Dayton, Inc., OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC., http://education.ohio.gov/ 
Topics/Community-Schools/Sponsor-Documents/Sponsors/Kids-Count-of-Dayton-Inc 
[https://perma.cc/7RJ3-JPYM] (last modified Oct. 13, 2016). 
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The legislation, as it is currently written, allows for groups that have no 
business in the education industry to sponsor charter schools. It also allows for 
corruption scandals to prosper. The Ohio Department of Education’s failure to 
keep a careful reign on its charter industry has brought embarrassment to the 
state.61 
B. The Law, Pre-House Bill 2 
When charter school laws were first enacted, the State Board of Education, 
which oversees the Ohio Department of Education, was one of only three 
entities that was able to authorize charter schools.62 In 2003, after the Ohio 
Department of Education rejected several applicants due to problems with their 
applications, lawmakers temporarily reduced the department’s authority, 
forcing the department to turn over authorization of schools to other sponsors.63 
Now, the Office of School Sponsorship, within the Ohio Department of 
Education, is again permitted to authorize schools, and it also has the authority 
to reject schools that it does not wish to sponsor.64  
C. Critiques of Ohio’s System 
The state of Ohio has one of the most lax systems in the country in terms of 
whom it permits to authorize charter schools.65 Allowing nonprofit 
organizations to sponsor charter schools is rare;66 though this does not 
necessarily create the issue of inconsistent quality in schools, it does add variety 
to the types of authorizers.67 
                                                                                                                     
 61 See Charter Schools: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, supra note 13. 
 62 Doug Livingston, Ohio Charter-School Sponsors Are Responsible for Schools that 
Lost Taxpayer Money, AKRON BEACON J. (May 31, 2015), http://www.ohio.com/news/local/ 
ohio-charter-school-sponsors-are-responsible-for-schools-that-lost-taxpayer-money-1.596446 
[https://perma.cc/Z4X4-QR8G]; About the State Board of Education, OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://education.ohio.gov/State-Board/State-Board-of-Education-Home [https://perma.cc/ 
E3CK-YC33] (last modified Nov. 21, 2017). 
 63 Livingston, supra note 62. 
 64 Ohio School Sponsorship Program, supra note 40 (click on “Approval Criteria” 
hyperlink). 
 65 Types of Authorizers, NAT’L ASS’N CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS, 
http://www.qualitycharters.org/authorizer-types/ [https://perma.cc/DUJ3-YGTB]. Ohio is 
one of only two states that permit nonprofit organizations to serve as charter school 
authorizers. Id. The only type of NACSA-recognized authorizer that Ohio does not allow is 
an Independent Chartering Board (an independent group commissioned by the state that has 
a sole mission of authorizing and overseeing charter schools) and Non-Educational 
Government Entities (mayors or municipalities that serve as authorizers). Id. 
 66 Id. (noting that Ohio and Minnesota are the only two states in the country that allow 
nonprofit organizations to serve as charter school authorizers). 
 67 See Map: Who Oversees Charters in Your State?, EDUC. WK. (Aug. 27, 2014), 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/section/multimedia/charter-authorizers-by-state.html 
[https://perma.cc/NLL3-LYU2]. 
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Ohio charter schools having too many authorizers is an issue because many 
authorizer groups are unable to dedicate the appropriate time, money, effort, and 
resources into appropriate oversight of their school.68 The trouble arises when 
groups that have little experience with charter school authorization are charged 
with oversight of such a school.69 In the 2015–2016 school year, some of the 
worst rated charter school authorizers (rated “poor” with academic performance 
of an “F”) included Cincinnati City (sponsored two schools), Jackson City 
(sponsored one school), Lakewood Local (sponsored one school), Lawrence 
County ESC (sponsored one school), Lima City (sponsored one school), Lorain 
City (sponsored one school), Oregon City (sponsored one school), 
Reynoldsburg City (sponsored five schools), Rittman Exempted Village 
(sponsored one school), Southwest Licking Local (sponsored one school), and 
Youngstown City (sponsored one school).70  
Another critique lies in the indirect manner by which the state controls its 
charter schools.71 When the Ohio Department of Education sought to close VLT 
Academy in Cincinnati, Ohio, for poor performance (the school “failed to meet 
97% of the state standards applicable to it, received an ‘F’ on its latest report 
card,” and had a history of hiring family members in its public contracts),72 the 
Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas held that the Ohio Department of 
Education was required to serve as the sponsor for VLT Academy, and was also 
required to give the school enough money to pay its debts.73 This was reversed 
at the appellate level, but the fact remains that the Ohio Department of Education 
was required to appeal a ruling in order to close a poorly performing school that 
                                                                                                                     
 68 Joey Gustafson, Charter Authorizers Face Challenges, EDUC. NEXT, Summer 2013, 
at 32, 33–35; Patrick O’Donnell, Ohio Is the “Wild, Wild West” of Charter Schools, Says 
National Group Promoting Charter Standards, CLEVELAND.COM (Dec. 18, 2014), 
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2014/07/ohio_is_the_wild_wild_west_of.html 
[https://perma.cc/L6FF-CP8S]. 
 69 See Patrick O’Donnell, State Will Take Charter Schools Away from 21 Sponsors 
Slapped with “Poor” Ratings, CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 13, 2016), 
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2016/10/state_will_take_charter_schools_away_from_
21_sponsors_slapped_with_poor_ratings.html [https://perma.cc/4HFV-BAVT] (“[M]ost of the 
‘poor’ sponsors oversee just one or two schools, not dozens like some of the non-profits do. 
‘It’s the folks that dabble in this with one or two schools, more than those that do a lot,’ said 
State Sen. Peggy Lehner, chair of the Senate Education Committee.”). 
 70 Id.; Overall Sponsor Ratings, OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC., http://education.ohio.gov/Topics/ 
Community-Schools/Sponsor-Ratings-and-Tools/Overall-Sponsor-Ratings [https://perma.cc/ 
HP3F-NH2L] (last modified Aug. 23, 2017) (scroll to “Who sponsored my school in” and 
click “2015–2016”). 
 71 O’Donnell, supra note 43 (“Ohio doesn’t have a simple plan to weed out its bad 
charter schools. The state instead has an indirect strategy.”). 
 72 Ohio Department of Education’s Brief in Opposition to a Stay at 3, 7, VLT Acad. v. 
Ohio Dep’t of Educ., No. A-1402393 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Hamilton Cty. May 9, 2014). 
 73 Order Granting Appellant’s Motion, VLT Acad. v. Ohio Dep’t of Educ., No. 
A-1402393 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Hamilton Cty. July 15, 2014). 
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engaged in self-dealing.74 This decentralization of control leads to the Ohio 
Department of Education having no direct way to close a corrupt or 
underperforming school. 
III. ATTEMPTS AT REFORM IN THE STATE OF OHIO 
In the Ohio charter school industry, 2014 was laden with scandal. Criticism 
by a representative from the National Association of Charter School Authorizers 
at an early 2014 conference in Nashville, Tennessee brought embarrassment and 
national attention to the state’s authorizing system.75 As a part of the panel 
presentation, the representative stated, “Ohio has a real quality control 
problem . . . . Ohio’s more broken than the Wild West.”76 A 2015 Denver 
conference for reporters on school choice singled out Ohio’s laws as well.77 The 
Ohio 131st General Assembly introduced two pieces of legislation in early 
2015, House Bill 2 and Senate Bill 148, designed to rein in authorization laws.78 
Senate Bill 148, when it was introduced, was considered the stronger of the two 
charter school reform bills.79 Senate Bill 148 was largely forgotten when parts 
of its content were merged into House Bill 2.80 
House Bill 2 is an enacted piece of legislation that came about in the wake 
of public outrage regarding sponsor-hopping.81 It was introduced by Republican 
                                                                                                                     
 74 J.L. Brown, Embattled Charter VLT Academy Closes for Good, CINCINNATI 
ENQUIRER (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/education/2014/08/11/ 
embattled-charter-school-vlt-shuts-doors-for-good/13916819/ [https://perma.cc/WP3A-DH86]. 
 75 O’Donnell, supra note 68. 
 76 Id. 
 77 O’Donnell, supra note 18. 
 78 House Bill 2: Status, OHIO LEGISLATURE: 131ST GEN. ASSEMBLY, 
https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-status?id=GA131-HB-2 [https://perma.cc/ 
G9JY-G8QM]; Senate Bill 148: Status, OHIO LEGISLATURE: 131ST GEN. ASSEMBLY, 
https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-status?id=GA131-SB-148 
[https://perma.cc/DY7B-9C6W]. 
 79 See Editorial Board, Editorial, Charter-School Reforms Unveiled in Ohio Senate 
Need Tweaks but Are a Significant Step Forward, CLEVELAND.COM (Apr. 22, 2015), 
http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2015/04/charter-school_reforms_unveile.html 
[https://perma.cc/XA3C-KD7C]. 
 80 See Legislative Update, OHIO LATINO AFF. COMMISSION, http://ochla.ohio.gov/Portals/ 
0/Public%20Policy/Legislative%20Update%20June%2011,%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/2D65-
K8VK]. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3302.03 (West Supp. 2017) (offering no 
exemption for academic data in sponsor evaluation for dropout recovery schools), with 
H.R. 2, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016) (as introduced) (exempting 
academic data in sponsor evaluations for dropout recovery schools until July 1, 2016), and 
S. 148, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016) (as introduced) (offering no 
exemption for academic data in sponsor evaluation for dropout recovery schools). 
 81 See Patrick O’Donnell, Poor-Performing Charter Schools Aren’t Finding Second 
Chances After Ohio’s Charter Reform, CLEVELAND.COM (June 19, 2016), 
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2016/06/poor_performing_charter_school.html#incart_
m-rpt-1 [https://perma.cc/23MT-C5RQ]. 
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Representatives Kristina Roegner and Mike Dovilla,82 and it passed with 
support from a small amount of bipartisanship.83 
A. Content of House Bill 2 
House Bill 2 was introduced in the Ohio Legislature on January 28, 2015, 
and passed votes in both the Ohio House of Representatives and Senate on 
October 7, 2015.84 It was introduced specifically in order to end the practice of 
“sponsor-hopping,” where a charter school whose authorizer refused to continue 
to support them would simply shop to find a new authorizer.85 It tightens 
restrictions on charter school sponsors, advancing sponsorship practices to 
bolster state oversight of sponsors.86  
House Bill 2 clarifies the duty of a community school sponsor, requiring 
that a sponsor provide “monitoring and technical assistance” to each school that 
it sponsors.87 It changes the system by which authorizers are rated, creating four 
ratings of “exemplary,” “effective,” “ineffective,” or “poor,” based on the 
academic performance of students enrolled in an authorizer’s community 
schools, adherence to quality practices, and compliance with applicable laws 
and administrative rules.88 Authorizers that are rated ineffective are prohibited 
from sponsoring any additional charter schools, and those who receive such a 
rating for three consecutive years have their sponsorship authority revoked.89 
An authorizer who is rated poor has its sponsorship authority revoked.90  
An appeals process exists for sponsors receiving ratings of ineffective and 
poor.91 Those sponsors receiving ineffective and poor ratings have thirty days 
to appeal to the superintendent of public instruction.92 Within thirty days of 
receipt of notice of appeal, the superintendent must appoint an independent 
                                                                                                                     
 82 House Bill 2: Summary, OHIO LEGISLATURE: 131ST GEN. ASSEMBLY, 
https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-summary?id=GA131-HB-2 
[https://perma.cc/6F5H-EC67]. 
 83 House Bill 2: Votes, OHIO LEGISLATURE: 131ST GEN. ASSEMBLY, 
https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-votes?id=GA131-HB-2 [https://perma.cc/ 
2SCF-M5FF] (indicating under “Votes” that twenty-nine Democrats in the House voted for 
the bill alongside sixty-three Republicans, and that nine Democrats in the Senate voted for 
the bill alongside twenty-two Republicans and one Independent).  
 84 House Bill 2: Status, supra note 78.  
 85 O’Donnell, supra note 81. 
 86 Jim Siegel, House Passes Bill To Reform Ohio Charter Schools, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2015/03/26/charter-
bill-pass.html [https://perma.cc/U7RR-XVEG]. 
 87 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.023 (West Supp. 2017). 
 88 Id. § 3314.016(B)(1)(a)–(c), (B)(7)(b)–(c). 
 89 Id. § 3314.016(B)(7)(b)(i)–(ii). 
 90 Id. § 3314.016(B)(7)(c). 
 91 Id. § 3314.016(B)(7)(b)–(c). 
 92 Id. 
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hearing officer, who must conduct a hearing.93 Within forty-five days of the 
hearing’s completion, the state Board of Education must decide whether or not 
the revocation of authorizing authority is appropriate.94 House Bill 2 further 
disallows compensation of more than $125 per meeting for someone serving on 
the governing board of a community school.95 
B. Analysis of House Bill 2 
Chad Aldis of the Fordham Institute, an educational nonprofit think tank in 
Dayton and charter school sponsor, testified in favor of both House Bill 2 and 
Senate Bill 148 before the education subcommittee.96 In the portion of his 
testimony directed at House Bill 2, he spoke favorably about how sponsors are 
disallowed “from selling services to the schools that they sponsor,”97 a vital rule 
after the Olympus Schools scandal.98 He also mentioned approval of the 
requirement of conflict-of-interest statements, and independent fiscal officers 
and attorneys to ensure that boards are more independent.99  
The bill’s provisions requiring sponsor disclosure of how their 3% of funds 
are spent is a step in the right direction, but Aldis mentions that the bill does not 
go far enough as to actually prohibit spending the money on non-oversight 
expenditures.100 Though public disclosure certainly promotes transparency, this 
relies on public outcry in order to make change. Public outcry can create change, 
but it does not remediate a situation where a failing school, or failing sponsor, 
continues to fail to educate children.  
IV. TIGHTENING CONTROL ON AUTHORIZERS, AND INCREASING BOARD 
OF EDUCATION POWER 
The National Association of Charter School Authorizers proposes three 
governing principles that states should consider in their charter laws: (1) student 
access to good schools, (2) school autonomy, and (3) school and standard 
                                                                                                                     
 93 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.016(B)(7)(b)–(c). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. § 3314.02(E)(5). 
 96 Thomas B. Fordham Institute Proponent Testimony on Ohio House Bill 2 and Senate 
Bill 148 Before the S. Subcomm. on Educ., 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015) 
[hereinafter Aldis Testimony], https://edexcellence.net/articles/thomas-b-fordham-institute-
proponent-testimony-on-ohio-house-bill-2-and-senate-bill-148 [https://perma.cc/PG2G-BPXE] 
(statement of Chad Aldis, Vice President, Thomas B. Fordham Institute).  
 97 Id. 
 98 See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
 99 Aldis Testimony, supra note 96. This too was a problem faced in the Olympus 
Schools scandal. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text. The provision requiring that 
contracts with attorneys and accountants be independent from school operators can be found 
in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.03(A)(31). 
 100 Aldis Testimony, supra note 96. 
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accountability.101 Eight policies designed to further this goal include: allowing 
“at least one body other than the local school district” to authorize charter 
schools; state standards for authorizer quality; evaluations for authorizers; 
sanctions for authorizers; that each authorizer annually publish a report about 
the academic performance of each of its schools; that high-performing schools 
are encouraged to replicate; that authorizers are able to close schools that do not 
meet their academic expectations; and that schools performing below a certain 
minimum threshold are closed by default.102 
In order to prevent states from becoming the “Wild West” of charter school 
laws, the state should establish greater independence between those who 
authorize and monitor charter schools, and those who have a vested interest in 
their success. First, states should enact strict authorization laws, if the states are 
not serving as the authorizers of charter schools themselves. Second, charter 
schools should borrow separation of control principles from corporate law to 
prevent self-dealing and corruption.  
A. Toward a Stricter Authorization System 
In order for charter schools to serve students and communities effectively, 
they must be strictly governed and closely regulated.103 This requires cutting a 
large number of the exceptions and concessions that are given to charter schools 
that are not meeting the state’s requirements, or that are continuing to permit 
ineffective charter schools to operate. States should tightly control which 
entities get to be authorizers, with a focus on decreasing the number of charter 
school operators that authorize fewer than five schools. 
                                                                                                                     
 101 NAT’L ASS’N OF CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS, ON THE ROAD TO GREAT CHARTER 
SCHOOLS: STATE POLICY ANALYSIS 4 (2016), http://www.qualitycharters.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/On-The-Road-to-Great-Charter-Schools-State-Policy-Analysis-
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/UML5-62KB]. 
 102 Id. 
 103 See Marci Cornell-Feist, Steering the Course for Success: Authorizers and Effective 
Charter School Governance, AUTHORIZER ISSUE BRIEF (Nat’l Ass’n Charter Sch. 
Authorizers), Jan. 2005, at 1, 1, http://www.qualitycharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/ 
IssueBrief_SteeringTheCourseForSuccess_2005.09.pdf [https://perma.cc/79TP-NGFM]  
(“Teacher competencies, student achievement, parental and community support, adequate 
facilities and resources are all critical and essential for success. Governance will determine 
how those characteristics are initiated, managed, supported and promoted.”); Doug Gavel, 
Weighing In on the Charter School Debate, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. (Jan. 24, 2017), 
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/research-insights/policy-topics/education-training-and-labor/ 
weighing-charter-school-debate [https://perma.cc/B8RH-7QRM] (“Designing an effective 
charter school policy therefore requires attention to details about accountability and other 
features . . . . Choices along all these dimensions affect the extent to which charters can be a 
positive choice for students whose options are otherwise limited.”). 
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1. Increasing State Control of Authorizers 
New York’s charter school authorization system utilizes only a few bodies 
that are closely tied to the government.104 This allows for strict monitoring and 
watch. New York’s Board of Regents itself oversees schools that are approved, 
and holds itself partly responsible for the monitoring and inspection of operating 
schools.105 Compare this to Ohio’s process of evaluating a middleman sponsor, 
then relying on that middleman sponsor, followed by the state beginning the 
slow process of revoking the authorizing power of the sponsor in case the 
authorizer fails to respond appropriately.106  
A second option for states is the creation of an independent, statewide board 
that approves charter schools, as is used in Washington state and is 
recommended by the National Association of Charter School Authorizers.107 
This model stays true to the heart of charter schools, in that it offers 
independence from the state department of education.108 At the same time, it 
eliminates the chances for authorizer shopping, where a school “shops” for an 
authorizer with weak standards for approval.109 It also allows authorizers to 
focus singly on charter school quality while maintaining “statewide scope.”110  
Ohio’s system, as opposed to both New York’s system and the system of an 
independent statewide board, was created in a way that removed power directly 
from the government.111 The authority to authorize charter schools was filtered 
down to a group of educational and nonprofit institutions, and an abandonment 
of this system would require complete restructuring of the law. The extensive 
changes necessary render this an unlikely possibility. 
Minnesota’s law offers a closer model for Ohio to mimic. Minnesota, like 
Ohio, grants authorization power to educational institutions and nonprofit 
organizations within the state, and is the only other state in the country that 
permits nonprofit organizations to authorize charter schools.112 Minnesota 
tightly regulates who the nonprofit organization can be; the nonprofit must have 
                                                                                                                     
 104 See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2852(9–a)(a) (McKinney 2015). 
 105 Id. § 2853(2). 
 106 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.016(B) (West Supp. 2017). 
 107 Arianna Prothero, States Create Independent Boards To Approve Charters, EDUC. 
WK., Aug. 20, 2014, at 1, 17. The State Board of Education in Washington is responsible for 
approving school districts that wish to be authorizers of charter schools, and also authorizes 
charter schools through the Washington State Charter School Commission. Public Charters, 
WASH. STATE BD. OF EDUC., http://www.sbe.wa.gov/charters.php#.WM9KjRLytsM 
[https://perma.cc/54A9-ZGVD]. 
 108 See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text. 
 109 Prothero, supra note 107, at 17. 
 110 Id. 
 111 See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text. 
 112 Types of Authorizers, supra note 65. 
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existed for at least twenty-five years and the school must have existed “for at 
least three years under a different authorizer.”113 
Minnesota’s law also gives the ability to rescind a charter directly to the 
state, where the state of Ohio has created quite a bit of distance between itself 
and the charter school. For example, Minnesota’s commissioner may terminate 
the contract between a charter school authorizer and the school if the authorizer 
performs unsatisfactorily.114 In Ohio’s system, three years of a sponsor 
receiving ineffective ratings, or one year of a sponsor receiving a poor rating, 
from the department of education leads to its sponsorship authority being 
revoked.115 Revocation of sponsorship authority is thought to disincentivize 
sponsors from continuing to allow poor-performing charter schools to exist.116 
B. Defined Separation of Control Between Authorizer and School 
A problem that has haunted Ohio’s charter schools is a lack of separation of 
control between a charter school authorizer and those who operate the charter 
                                                                                                                     
 113 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124E.05, subd. 1(4) (West Supp. 2016). Ohio, on the other hand, 
permits any 501(c)(3) to sponsor a charter school as long as they have been in operation for 
at least five years (compared to Minnesota’s twenty-five), the entity has at least $500,000 in 
assets and a record of financial responsibility, the entity is an education-oriented entity, and 
the entity is not itself a community school. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.02(C)(1)(f) (West 
Supp. 2017). Minnesota’s law makes it much harder for a fledgling nonprofit organization 
to add authorization of charter schools to its mission, because of the wait period of three 
years for a school, or twenty-five years for an authorizer. Note that single-purpose 
authorizers are able to be formed, as long as they are charitable and nonsectarian and exist 
“for the sole purpose of [authorizing] charter[]schools.” MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124E.05, subd. 
1(5) (West 2016). 
 114 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124E.05, subd. 6. Some of the reasons provided for the 
commissioner terminating an authorizer’s ability to charter a school include the authorizer 
failing to demonstrate the criteria under which the school was approved, violating the 
chartering contract between itself and the school, or performing unsatisfactorily, or for “any 
good cause shown that provides the commissioner a legally sufficient reason to take 
corrective action against an authorizer.” Id. at subd. 6(b). 
 115 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.016(B)(7)(b)(ii), (B)(7)(c). For an example of how the 
pressure on charter school sponsors is working (though less directly than the system in 
Minnesota), see Patrick O’Donnell, Auction Ends Dreams for Closed Cleveland Charter 
School, CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf 
/2016/11/auction_ends_dreams_for_closed.html [https://perma.cc/3WVH-R9PH]. 
 116 O’Donnell, supra note 81. There exists a separate process by which the department 
of education can directly close down a school—by sending an “intent to close” letter. Doug 
Livingston, Poorly Performing Charter Schools Sue Ohio for Trying To Shut Them Down, 
AKRON BEACON J. (June 16, 2015), http://www.ohio.com/news/break-news/poorly-performing-
charter-schools-sue-ohio-for-trying-to-shut-them-down-1.600849 [https://perma.cc/L6LH-3QYF]. 
However, this process is difficult because it opens the department up to litigation after 
“singling out” certain schools for closure. See, e.g., Patrick O’Donnell, State Succeeds in 
Closing Three Charter Schools—Imagine Cleveland, Villaview, and Cleveland Community 
School, CLEVELAND.COM (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2015/08/ 
state_succeeds_in_closing_thre.html [https://perma.cc/27SH-4HWR].  
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schools themselves.117 As overseers and accreditors, authorizers should be 
independent from school leadership. The principles of separation of control and 
independence exist in the corporate law context, and, thus, can be adapted for 
use in the education privatization context.118 House Bill 2 created a conflict-of-
interest provision for charter school sponsors, but it does not go far enough in 
ensuring that true separation of control exists.119 
The corporate law concept of establishing independence in a special 
litigation committee is exemplified in Einhorn v. Culea.120 The test of 
independence asks,  
Considering the totality of the circumstances . . . whether a reasonable 
person in the position of a member of a special litigation committee can 
base his or her decision on the merits of the issue rather than on 
extraneous considerations or influences . . . whether a member of a 
committee has a relationship with an individual defendant . . . that 
would reasonably be expected to affect the member’s judgment with 
respect to the litigation in issue.121 
Factors relevant to independence include “[a] committee member’s 
participation in or approval of the alleged wrongdoing or financial benefits from 
the challenged transaction[,] . . . past or present business or economic dealings 
with an individual defendant[,] . . . [and] past or present personal, family, or 
social relations with individual defendants . . . .”122 
Establishing independence is a widely accepted practice in corporate law,123 
and the privatization of public education should be accompanied by the 
utilization of governance laws and standard practices of the private sector.124 
This principle should be implemented because corporate history has proven the 
                                                                                                                     
 117 See supra notes 54–60 and accompanying text. 
 118 See infra notes 120–23 and accompanying text. 
 119 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.02(E)(7). House Bill 2 requires that members of the 
charter school governing authority annually file statements with the names of immediate 
relatives or business associates who, within the previous three years, have been employed 
by the following: charter school sponsor, operator, school districts or educational service 
centers in contract with the school, or vendors for the school within the previous three years. 
Id. 
 120 Einhorn v. Culea, 612 N.W.2d 78, 81 (Wis. 2000). 
 121 Id. at 89. 
 122 Id.  
 123 See Jeremy J. Kobeski, In Re Oracle Corporation Derivative Litigation: Has a New 
Species of Director Independence Been Uncovered?, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 850 (2004). 
 124 See 303A.02 Independence Tests, N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH), http://nysemanual.nyse.com 
/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4_3_3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%
2Flcm-sections%2F [https://perma.cc/5WUX-DSKL]; Corporate Governance Requirements, 
NASDAQ, http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode= 
chp_1_1_4_3&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq-equityrules%2F (on file with Ohio 
State Law Journal). 
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implementation to be a wise one.125 If schools are to be privately run and 
privately governed, they should be held to the same standard of governance to 
which other private entities hold themselves. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Charter schools will only continue to be reviled until substantial reforms are 
made in the system that authorizes their operation. Departments of education 
must be given the authority that they need to close down ineffective charter 
schools, and to stop ineffective sponsors from continuing to sponsor charter 
schools. States looking to expand the reach of their charter schools should 
ensure that their system is either centralized by the state or tightly checked. 
Though it is unlikely that Ohio will be able to get to a system of more centralized 
control, like that of New York, there are certainly legislative checks that Ohio 
can put on groups that are authorizing charter schools. 
Ohio, and other states looking to create or change their charter school laws, 
must find ways to ensure that the mistakes that have been made in the past are 
not made again. Authorization laws should be strict, and the state department of 
education should be empowered to directly close failing schools. Control 
between a charter school and its authorizer, who is supposed to provide 
oversight, must be separate.  
Failing schools fail children; permitting failing schools to continue to 
operate disserves entire communities. Ohio, and all states with weak charter 
school laws, must make reforms in order to create a better future.  
                                                                                                                     
 125 See The Lessons from Enron, ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2002), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/976011 [https://perma.cc/2E3S-RZTK] (“At the heart of these audit failures lies a set of 
business relationships that are bedevilled by perverse incentives and conflicts of interest.”). 
Enron’s auditors theoretically should have been independently selected by shareholders, but 
were actually selected by company management, and were therefore under the influence of 
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lucrative audit assignment. Against such a background, it is little wonder that the quality of 
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